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WHAT IS DUE TO OTHERS 
Speaking and Signifying Subject(s) of Rape Law 
Penny Pether
*
 
Australian journalist Paul Sheehans representation of the alleged and 
convicted immigrant Muslim/Arab rapists he demonises in Girls Like 
You, like his representation of the rape survivors in that text, has much 
to tell us about the laws production of rape laws speaking and 
signifying subjects, real rape victims and survivors, false accusers 
and perpetrators. This article uses a variety of texts, including Girls 
Like You, recent Australian rape law jurisprudence and legislative 
reform, texts involving two controversial recent US rape cases — one 
from Maryland and one from Nebraska — and a recent UK study on 
attrition in rape prosecutions, to explore some persistent legal 
problems in responding to the social harm of rape. It concludes that 
recent work on biopolitical models of rape law, applied to the New 
South Wales rape reform prompted in significant part by the Skaf and 
K rape cases, suggests that there is little hope of this law reform 
initiative reducing rape attrition. More disturbingly, via a 
somatechnological critique of the reforms production of infralegal 
subjects, it also proposes that its ends can be differently understood.  
This is a sordid, distressing, sad little case. From any perspective, its facts are 
appalling.1 
The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience. But 
petty cases are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact of a sordid 
little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to which the 
case gives rise … It is true also of journeys in the law that the place you reach 
depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out on a 
case depends on where one goes in.2 
Those at the margins of world politics understand violence.3 
This article addresses persistently high levels of attrition in the prosecution of rape 
cases, evidencing the failure of successive waves of rape law reform in the common 
law world — even in jurisdictions that have made apparently radical statutory 
reforms, ostensibly to address rape prosecution attrition. It emerges from several 
distinct bodies of my recent work. The first has involved picking up feminist work 
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on rape law, law reform and language, 4 put aside in 1999.5 The second is work on 
the theory and practice of common law judging in the contemporary United States,6 
part of a larger project on theorising ethical judging practices and subjects, 
tentatively titled Fresh Judging. The third is comparative constitutional law 
scholarship on ‘post-9/11 constitutionalism’ and constitutional adjudication in 
common law countries, which has engaged with the treatment by legal institutions 
and subjects of two groups of paradigmatic ‘others’ of the contemporary nation-
state: Islamic ‘suspected terrorists’ or ‘unassimilable’ asylum-seekers (two 
categories which frequently bleed, de facto, de jure, or discursively one into the 
other); and that group of sex offenders who in the United States are called ‘sexually 
violent predators’.7 To simplify the complex, constitutional courts — including 
constitutional courts of final jurisdiction in the United States, Britain and Australia 
— have in the last decade, and increasingly since 9/11, addressed what 
constitutional rights or criminal procedural protections should be available to these 
‘others’ in circumstances where legislatures have sought radically to abridge or 
circumscribe them.  
The productive uses of a somatechnological critique for examining the 
phenomenon of rape attrition, which persists despite ostensibly radical reforms both 
of legal texts and the cultural formation of actors in the legal system responsible for 
instantiating the state’s response to the ‘social harm’ of rape, are considerable. 
‘[Troubl[ing] the boundary between embodied subject and technologized object’,8 
somatechnics draws attention to the production of the body through ‘the techné of 
symbolic manipulation’,9 as ‘the tangible outcome of historically and culturally 
specific techniques and modes of embodiment processes’.10 If rape attrition 
instantiates a violent and persistent failure of intersubjective ethics, giving the lie to 
the promises of the liberal nation state, somatechnological critique opens up the 
possibility of a ‘re-evaluation and reframing of [those] ethics — of the proper 
regard for the interrelationship between other, self and world’.11 Additionally, I 
conclude in this article that a distinctively biopolitical model of rape statute and 
discourse on rape law reform has been mobilised in contemporary Australia both to 
instantiate ‘altercidal violence directed at [Islamic] bodies in Australia’12 and to 
enact a reactive white ‘hypermasculinity’13 through the identification of the state as 
a patriarchal guarantor of ‘women’s rights’, which it at once grants and denies. 
Further, rape itself, and the law’s failure to turn the resources of state power to 
effectively ‘discipline and punish’ it, advance both the ‘anatamo-political’ and the 
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‘biopolitical’ ends of sovereign power, to ‘reproduc[e] violent and unequal 
relations’ 14 of gender and of ‘“culturalist” racism’.15  
Let me draw these strands of thinking and writing together. In Just Silences, a 
book about ‘modern law, its speech and silences, and its relationship to what is 
arguably the traditional concern of jurisprudence — justice’,16 Marianne Constable 
concludes that: 
the [various] silences of the law [just, unjust, ambiguous] open up questions 
of the speaking of law and its current grounding in social power. In an age of 
loquacious and powerful positive law, silences tell of what lies buried, 
concealed and hidden and possibly dead, within positive law.17  
In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, Thomas Hardy, a Victorian novelist and poet and also 
a pessimistic herald of the modern, deploys silence, speech and writing to explore a 
persisting question about law, society and justice that likewise concerns me: how to 
address, to name and respond to what a student of criminal law learns to call ‘the 
social harm’ of rape.  
We — or at least some of ‘us’ — know, of course, of the sociological data that 
attests to the social harm of rape: its staggering frequency and the frequency with 
which its victim is not recognised or is disbelieved; the differing kinds of damage it 
does to those who are its victims — psychic, physical, reputational, relational, 
existential, economic.18 But as Constable’s insistent scepticism about legal 
sociology’s empiricist discourse of totalising knowledge and law’s equally 
totalising solipsistic positivism might suggest, that knowledge is inadequate to do 
justice — or even, perhaps, to make it possible, because at last and in context, 
imaginable.  
In Hardy’s novel, Tess’s rape is registered by silence,19 marked in the most 
uncompromising of generic silences of the (originally serialised) Victorian novel, 
the anti-climactic chapter break that also constitutes a decisive narrative lacuna, 
because in this novel it is not picked up neatly by seamless chronology and 
continuous emplotment when the new chapter begins.20 It is also registered by a 
cacophony of accounting for it. Hardy’s voluble and opinionated narrator,21 that 
narrator’s omniscient counterpart22 and characters in the novel23 — including proxies 
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for ‘Nature’24 — all tell stories about the rape ‘itself’, about cultural stories that 
surround rape, about the intelligible signs of the harm the rape has done to Tess, 
about the circumstances that might bring about the unlikely coincidence of rape, 
law and justice. For Tess, justice — although not judgment — is deferred, 
suspended, foreclosed: as the novel ends, Tess hangs for the murder of her rapist, in 
circumstances that offer her no (legal) defence. So too the autonomy symbolised by 
her resistance to her rapist had proved chimerical, ‘expos[ing] the double standards 
and inequalities of Western liberalism’,25 aptly signified by the brutal faithlessness 
of her husband, Angel Clare, Hardy’s poignant symbol of the Enlightenment and of 
colonialism. Her (chaste) younger sister, her symbolic intactness, her sexual 
integrity foregrounded — ‘a tall budding creature, half girl, half woman … a 
spiritualised image of Tess, slighter than she, but with the same beautiful eyes’26 — 
takes her place with the husband whose rejection of Tess — a product of embodied 
culture as of the rape, itself a practice embedded in structural inequality and 
embodied violence — has, like the rape itself, led to the murder.  
This article begins, then, from the point to which research for it led, with a 
conclusion that might well arrest work of the kind the article constitutes in its 
tracks. After successive waves of reform in many jurisdictions across the world, the 
law — in which I include statutory language; common law rules and judicial 
glosses on statutory language; evidentiary rules; courtroom practices and discourses 
at interlocutory, trial and appellate levels; the situated material practices of legal 
actors including law enforcement officers, prosecutors and defence lawyers, juries, 
judges and law reform professionals — continues to find itself not even 
approximately equal to addressing the social harm of rape, let alone to anything that 
might be recognised as justice. Rape remains, with a stubborn persistence, common, 
under-recognised, under-reported, under-detected, under-prosecuted, under-
convicted and under-punished.  
Recent studies documenting the extraordinarily high contemporary rates of 
what is called ‘attrition’ in rape prosecutions can be found in the New South Wales 
Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce Report, published in April 2006,27 and 
in the British Home Office’s 2005 Report, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in 
Reported Rape Cases.28 Read against statistics documented in the law and social 
science literature on rape that proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s, the contemporary 
data establish that statutory rape law reform, whether substantive (as in offence 
definitions) or procedural (as in evidentiary rules), and associated law reform 
directed to embodied subjects, including reform of police practices and judicial 
education, have had no effect on improving the rates of the prosecution of and 
conviction for rape. In his landmark 1989 sociological study of rapes reported in 
Indianapolis in a three-year period in the early 1970s, Gary LaFree reported that 
only 12 per cent of rapes reported to police resulted in conviction, and also that 
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‘these 881 reported cases no doubt represent only a fraction of all rapes that actually 
occurred in Indianapolis during the years of my study’.29 To quote the British Home 
Office Report, ‘the two patterns in reported rape cases in England and Wales over 
the past two decades … [are] a continuing and unbroken increase in reporting; and a 
relatively static number of convictions’.30  
In a parliamentary debate on a criminal procedure reform Bill that responded 
in part to the New South Wales Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce Report, 
New South Wales MHR Chris Hartcher said: 
The New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research figures show 
a dramatic increase in the number of sexual assaults reported to police — in 
2002–03, 9,151 and to the end of June 2004, 11,000.  
*** 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates that only 20 per cent of rapes 
are reported, which means we are looking at a potential figure of 
approximately 60,000 sexual assaults in New South Wales in the past year. 
For that same period, there were just 247 convictions. So the gap between 
reported sexual assaults and convictions is enormous. It is a serious challenge 
to our society that must be accepted and met if our society is going to afford 
women the protection and dignity to which they are entitled and the respect 
and protection that the law must afford all its citizens. A further report in 
January of this year in respect to the 300 people who responded to the 
landmark survey of 2005, that I have already addressed, stated that the latest 
figures showed that 98 per cent of accused sex attackers walked free in 2004. 
That would equate with a figure that was supplied to me — and I believe is 
accurate but I cannot find its source — that only 1 per cent of sexual assault 
complaints result in a prison sentence. Any society in which 98 per cent of 
sex attackers can walk free is a society that does not adequately address the 
issue.31  
Let me articulate as precisely as I can the evidence that exists to account for 
the stubborn resistance of rape law to reform. Most rapes are what Susan Estrich, a 
long time ago, called ‘simple rapes’.32 That is, they are not what she famously called 
‘real rapes’,33 but rather ‘rapes in which there is some type of relationship between 
the assailant and the victim; rapes in which the victim and assailant know one 
another; rapes in which little physical (extrinsic) violence is present; rapes in which 
an extralegal victim precipitation logic is employed; and rapes in which the 
“contributory behavior” of the victim forms the primary defense strategy’.34 Thus 
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the rape to which the law has persistently not been able to do justice is ‘really’ not 
the so-called ‘real’ rape, which is (comparatively) possible to prosecute to 
conviction if the perpetrator is identified, but the overwhelming majority of 
‘simple’ rape. As studies — including the recent Home Office study and LaFree’s 
research — show, victim social marginalization and/or ‘nontraditional behavior’,35 
characteristics which arguably define ‘simple’ rapes, increase the rate of attrition 
and decrease the likelihood of successful prosecution. In rape and in rape law, then, 
gendered bodies speak volumes; they matter, although they are rarely ‘listene[ed] 
out for, nor recognized’.36 
This has both a social/evidentiary and a doctrinal aspect. Victims who do not 
conform to stereotypes of chaste women — which arguably includes all victims of 
‘simple rape’ — are subject to layers of social and institutional disbelief of their 
stories. Additionally, allegations that ‘victims had … engaged in nontraditional 
behavior’ were particularly important in ‘jury-tried rape cases … when the major 
disputed issue involved whether the complainant was a rape victim’:37 
nontraditional victim behavior was most often alleged in cases in which the 
major legal defense was either consent or no-intercourse. Such allegations 
were less likely when the major defense was either identification or the 
defendant’s diminished responsibility. The extremes were consent and 
diminished-responsibility defenses. In the former, victims were always 
portrayed as gender-role nontraditional; in the latter, they never were.38  
The inscription of bodies matters too: rape law reform operates in cultural 
contexts that get in the way of the effectiveness of conventional strategies of reform 
aimed at offence definition, evidentiary and other procedural rules, and the 
‘education’ of police and judges. As Iglesias, one of a group of feminist scholars 
undertaking interdisciplinary law and linguistic humanities work on rape in the late 
1980s and 1990s, registered, those cultural contexts include ‘dominant cultural 
narratives’39 about sex and gender, and the extralegal structures, institutions, 
embodied subjects (police, prosecutors, jurors, judges, perpetrators, victims) and 
practices that sustain them. In similar vein, Frohmann and Mertz concluded that to 
‘effectuate social change through legal reform … formal attempts to alter statutes 
and policies must be supplemented by analysis of the social and cultural patterns 
that shape the implementation, interpretation, and effect of the law’.40  
Iglesias and Frohmann and Mertz made important contributions to the body of 
(frequently linguistic) sociolegal work in the late twentieth century that studied 
those cultural narratives and social and cultural patterns. Other reform-oriented rape 
law scholars working in the sociolinguistic traditions or employing insights drawn 
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from those traditions in that period included Greg Matoesian,41 Kim Lane 
Scheppele,42 Stephen Schulhofer43 and Andrew Taslitz.44 Many of those scholars, 
like Mertz and Scheppele, have moved on to other areas of research. Why? Let me 
hazard a guess: the work is unprofitable. We have disinterred a great deal of 
information from and about the unjust silences of rape law; we know why to speak 
of justice in the context of rape law likewise attests to a blind and unjustified faith 
in the efficacy of positive law to do justice; we know much about what changes — 
to stories, to speech and to silence — might mitigate injustice. But all the speech 
and the writing, the scholarship and the legislation and the training programs and 
manuals and the textual artefacts of law reform have changed nothing, except 
perhaps that a larger number of women in many cultures are reporting rapes, only to 
experience the various instantiations of the embodied institutional and discursive 
‘second rape’ that is one of the predictors of attrition.  
Is change (and perhaps justice) possible? After all, the relationship of gender 
discourses and credibility discourses — which are both written and spoken, and 
silent (tacit and/or unconscious) — manifests many consistencies over time and 
across space: some kinds of women are presumed in many cultures at many times to 
lie about alleged rapes for reasons ranging from a gendered lack of integrity to 
feminine hysteria or madness to revenge to guilt to seeking to excuse consensual 
sexual behaviour. Nonetheless, some of the excellent recent historical scholarship 
on rape and law in the United States establishes that: 
There are constants in the female experience of rape. The typical rape victim 
in the seventeenth century, as today, was unmarried, employed, knew her 
attacker, and was unlikely to report the assault. Her assailant, in the unlikely 
event of prosecution, offered a defense as effective in the early modern world 
as today: the sexual activity had been consensual; there had been no struggle; 
and, he would assert, her sexual reputation was such that no reasonable man 
would have expected to meet with a refusal.45  
Historically, experiences of rape have also been capable of variation or change. For 
example, ‘[a]mong Puritans, men were assumed to have a “proclivity for lying”, 
and women, despite their personal histories, were largely believed. In the 
[seventeenth century] Chesapeake, rather than give credence to a [white] woman’s 
word, magistrates doubted it, unless her assailant was black’.46 Lisa Lindquist 
Dorr’s work on interracial rape prosecutions in Virginia in the twentieth century 
argues that the work of the civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century, 
together with influential postwar Freudian accounts of female sexuality, led to some 
limited improvements in the legal outcomes experienced by black men accused of 
raping white women, and still more limited improvements to legal protections for 
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black women raped by white men.47 Elsewhere, Lindquist Dorr discerns evidence of 
complex social contexts in which interracial rape in twentieth century Virginia 
operated,48 showing — like Hambleton — that reputation and social class and 
community status of rape victims — indexes of citizenship, if you like — played a 
significant role in the likelihood that an accusation of rape would result in a 
conviction, even in the context of interracial rape in the Jim Crow South.  
So, if we know a great deal about the kinds of changes that might enable law to 
do justice to the crime of rape, and we know that while such change is difficult 
there is some evidence that change can occur, why have the waves of rape law 
reform since the mid-twentieth century not made a difference to the law’s ability to 
do justice in the case of rape?  
As a means to find an answer to that question, and to begin to imagine how to 
bring rape to justice, I have been working on two (relatively recent)49 US cases on 
the relatively rare phenomenon of withdrawn consent or post-penetration rape 
prosecutions, speculating that if we put the marginal at the centre we might find out 
how adequately to respond to the social harm of rape.50 These cases are a 
particularly acute site for contestation about what is rape and what is consensual 
sex; they purport to be able to distinguish between rape and consensual sex when 
they are in very close quarters; they likewise show that some judges find it very 
hard to tell the difference between rape and consensual sex. In the three withdrawn 
consent cases of which my earlier work offered extended readings51 — Kaitamaki, a 
1980 ‘real rape’ case from New Zealand,52 the 2003 California case John Z53 and the 
2006–08 Maryland case Baby54 — the formal legal inquiry proceeded on the basis 
that consensual sex might change into rape. Thus it proceeded on the logic that the 
law can tell the difference and focused, unusually literally and explicitly, on what 
imaginary or at least legally inscribed bodies, and embodied subjects and their 
words, might enable it to do so. The jury verdicts in each case and the final result of 
all three on appeal55 might be viewed as evidence of ‘progressive’ rape law reform 
of a kind analogous to the ending or limiting of the marital rape immunity in many 
Western common law jurisdictions. In each case, however, there was at least one 
judicial officer56 who engaged in what used to appear to me to be the kind of 
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Martian reasoning that, in semiotic analysis’s equivalent of res ipsa loquitur, would 
make starkly visible to law students the traces — less evident but often present in 
other cases — of continuously circulating and powerful cultural discourses 
apparently proving what is often presented as one of Catherine MacKinnon’s more 
contested claims: that, under current sociocultural conditions, sex is believed to be 
‘what women are for’57 and, by extension, many women’s consent to sex may be 
assumed.  
These cases, then, were of the class that I used to think about as gifts to the 
feminist legal scholar and teacher — that is, where a judge is so evidently working 
within an interpretive universe that is flagrantly patriarchal and misogynist that 
most ordinary, reasonable people, or at least the average law student with no 
particular commitment or even some hostility to feminist ways of reading the law, 
will perceive him as a troglodyte, and transfer that perception from judicial officer 
to our legal culture’s paradigmatic way of defining the crime of rape. And that 
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person will be able to identify less flagrantly patriarchal or misogynistic cultural 
scripts when he or she strikes them elsewhere in the law’s texts, including US legal 
culture’s paradigmatic, distinctive and comparatively reform-resistant way of 
defining the crime of rape.  
The recent law reform texts referred to above, and the withdrawn consent 
cases, showing that a certain well of common sense about presumed consent has 
remained pristine over the course of nearly 30 years of law reform, mean that I 
increasingly do not take that reading of bodies and words for granted. Radically 
differing perceptions of what bodies and words mean in rape law’s contexts may be 
more or less culturally natural or even accessible, depending on how one reads and 
from which perspective, and thus what one sees and hears.  
Thus Baby v State58 involves normative judgments both about whether 
withdrawn consent can ground a forcible rape conviction, and how evidence in rape 
cases against men and boys who use deception, coercion and/or violence, 
familiarity with cultural texts, and/or the force of numbers to coerce vulnerable, 
because especially powerless, women and girls59 — those who, for reasons that 
frequently include socioeconomic disadvantage, manifest ‘nonconformity to 
stereotypical gender roles’60 — into sex should be read.  
Should bodies and words be read on the one hand with an eye to evidence of 
locked doors, isolated places, beatings, perpetrators holding victims down while 
other perpetrators rape them, or themselves physically forcing compliance with sex 
acts in the face of struggles and verbal expressions of non-consent? Or, on the 
other, should they be read with an eye for ‘bad girls’ who put themselves in unsafe 
places and get what they deserve, an ear deaf to what was evidently perceived by 
the John Z dissenter and the Baby interim appellate court as the lack of integrity 
signaled by ‘evidently’ inarticulate manifestation of and evidence about non-
consent and resistance? Should they be approached from a perspective informed by 
the understanding that ‘simple’ rape is in fact ‘real’ rape, rather than the vast middle 
excluded by the binary of rape and consensual sex, and thus the business of a court 
attentive to the call of justice — or, as the interim appellate court did in Baby: 
excavating texts from rape law’s doctrinal history and asserting that they bound its 
future?  
Likewise, Justice Brown’s dissent in John Z is salutary. Drawing on cultural 
resources also available to the dissenter in Kaitamaki, she opined that ‘sexual 
intercourse is not transformed into rape merely because a woman changes her 
mind’.61 Of even more salience for my purposes here are her concession that 
‘[o]rdinarily, these cases involve a credibility contest in which the victim tells one 
story, the defendant another’, and her characterisation of the facts as a ‘sordid, 
distressing, sad little case’, involving as it did the actualised sexual objectification 
and abuse of a 17-year-old girl, ‘alone in a house with four young men … [o]ne of 
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… [whom] is “sort of” her boyfriend’, by both the ‘boyfriend’, who pled to charges 
of sexual battery and unlawful sexual intercourse, and John Z.62  
The answer to the question about how to use insights about law and language 
and culture, and centring the marginal that is actually the excluded middle to 
change the grim picture of rape attrition that I tentatively reached in this inquiry, 
and the one I would have been inclined to give until relatively recently, is 
summarised by what Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik wrote in Convergences: 
Law, Literature, and Feminism: ‘Different texts. The same texts read differently. 
Other voices included in the conversation. Different behavior.’63 
That is, ‘bodies and languages’, as Alain Badiou dismissively puts it64 — or 
what Pierre Bourdieu calls the habitus, embodied experience65 — matter. This 
instinct is not confined to scholars: in the recent high-profile successive 
(unsuccessful) rape prosecutions of Pamir Safi in Nebraska, the victim, Tory 
Bowen, was willing to risk the mistrial that eventually aborted the second, and in 
the event final prosecution of this alleged serial rapist, by publicly protesting the 
trial judge’s gag order that had sought to prevent her using a range of words in her 
testimony: one of them was ‘rape’.66 Seeking such gag orders has become standard 
operating practice for defence lawyers in US rape cases.67  
What can be done to change this? I would have suggested reading legal texts 
against the grain, intertextually and contextually, in order both to make visible 
circulating networks of meaning and representation in legal and other cultural texts, 
and to determine ‘how [it is] … possible [for judges] to know that, to think that’,68 
and thus to pass judgment and read and write the law the way they do. One could 
then go on to use this ‘disrespectful’ approach to reading the law and strategies 
based on pedagogy grounded in the critical theoretical traditions to produce 
‘different affective and ethical outcomes’ in judging.69  
But as I worked on the withdrawn consent cases, I was struck by two insights. 
One was that survivor-oriented law reform of rape law doctrine and practice is 
almost always at best a two steps forward/one step back process, and at worst and 
increasingly it seems to me characteristically, a practice marked by stasis or 
regression. Why is this so? Next, even for a reader attuned to notice the stark 
differences between the selective narrative constructed from the trial transcript by 
majority and dissent, there is a certain commonsense resonance to Justice Brown’s 
visceral reaction to the facts of John Z: coerced group sex involving multiple young 
male perpetrators and a teenage victim, which is what both the recent US cases on 
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post-penetration rape discussed in this article involve. Tegan Wagner,70 the survivor 
of one of the K brothers’ ‘gang rapes’ in New South Wales, makes similar 
suggestions about contemporary Australian culture.71  
At that point, I began to understand the problem of attrition in rape cases 
differently, and much less hopefully. What brought me to that position? The first 
thing was the stark evidence of the brutal impoverishment of lives of socially 
marginalised adolescents. As I read some of the many texts other than Tegan 
Wagner’s produced to account for the Skaf and K gang rape prosecutions in Sydney, 
I encountered other, similar lives: there were distinctive factual similarities, and 
similarities in victim profile, between the two recent ‘withdrawn consent’ rapes, and 
the Skaf and K ‘gang’ rapes.72 What is the bad news about addressing attrition that 
emerged from these intertextual comparisons? Law reforms operate in cultural 
contexts: the British Home Office Report indicates that the number of teenage rape 
victims was increasing and most sexual assaults were committed by ‘known men’;73 
the girls in these Australian ‘gang rape’ cases often engaged in the ‘non-traditional 
behavior’ that is associated with rape and rape attrition, 74 and if the characteristic 
profile of rape victims has changed little between the seventeenth century and the 
twenty-first, as Hambleton’s research suggests, there is also data suggestion that 
coercive sex came increasingly to characterise the life experiences of female 
adolescents in the United States in the 1990s.75 The ‘good’ news? In both John Z 
and Baby, the law was ‘changed’ in ‘progressive’ ways by the decisional courts; 
New South Wales saw some radical rewriting of its rape statute, at least partly in 
response to the Skaf and K cases.76  
Even before those putatively survivor-oriented reforms, New South Wales’ 
sexual assault statute was radical by contemporary comparative common law 
standards. When I teach rape law to law students in the United States, I have them 
do some comparative law analysis of rape statutes from differing jurisdictions, 
usually accompanied by some statutory drafting. It would go without saying to any 
US-based criminal law scholar or teacher that students know that they are not in 
Kansas, and affirmatively not in my present home state of Pennsylvania, when they 
read a rape statute that refers to a ‘surgically constructed vagina’.77 Even more 
capable of turning the world of US criminal law upside down is the recently 
reformed definition of the mens rea term ‘knowledge’: section 61 HA(3) of the 
New South Wales Crimes Act provides that: 
                                                           
70
  Wagner (2007). 
71
  Wagner (2007), p 225. 
72
  With arguably signal differences that in some K and Skaf cases knives were used to 
threaten victims, and an alleged gun used for that purpose in one Skaf case. 
73
  Kelly et al (2005), p x. 
74
  Kelly et al (2005), pp 23–24, 51–53, 58–63, 67, 72, 74, 80–82, 84; LaFree (1989), 
p 241. 
75
  Cherry (2001), pp 268–69. 
76
  Chris Hartcher, second reading speech, Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual and 
Other Offences) Bill 2006 (NSW), 25 October 2006, 
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LA20061025002. 
77
  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61(1)(a). 
PETHER: WHAT IS DUE TO OTHERS 249 
Knowledge about consent 
A person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent 
of the other person knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual 
intercourse if: 
(a) the person knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual 
intercourse, or 
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the other person consents to the 
sexual intercourse, or 
(c) the person has no reasonable grounds for believing that the other person 
consents to the sexual intercourse.78  
Law reform of the kind we see inscribed in the New South Wales sexual 
assault statute betrays beliefs in both bodies and words: as the transgendered body 
is recognised by rape law, so the male-to-female transgendered person who 
experiences rape becomes a legal subject ‘protected’ by the state, which will 
prosecute crimes against her; as ‘knowledge’ of consent is radically reinscribed, so 
it means anything but itself, so patriarchal stories that tell us all that consent to sex 
may be assumed, that sex is what women are for, at least formally no longer signify 
at law.  
I will end, however, on a less optimistic note, registering as I do so that to be 
optimistic about rape law reform is to run the risk of being perceived as delusional. 
I opened this article with a discussion of a jurisprudential text by a rhetorician of 
law who makes a powerful case for the necessary complexity with which we should 
think of language and silence and law and justice, and with a literary text that might 
be said to suggest that rape is not a site to which the law is equal to doing justice, 
unless the world which the law makes and in which it is made in its turn is turned 
upside down. I want to end with a discussion of other texts of positive law and of 
popular — or populist — legal sociology, a discussion that is informed by the 
Islamic legal historian Ruth Miller’s work about rape and biopolitics.79  
I will suggest that some more radical ways of understanding the development 
of contemporary legal regimes for criminalising or otherwise responding to the 
social harm of rape might at once demonstrate precisely how radical reform might 
need to be to make justice speak, and that she will remain, unjustly, silent — except 
to the extent that she is co-opted into fresh discourses of injustice. I quoted earlier 
from the New South Wales MHR Chris Hartcher’s speech in the parliamentary 
debate on a criminal procedure reform Bill that responded in part to the New South 
Wales Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce Report. In addition to delivering 
statistics about rape attrition, Hartcher also said: 
As well as the staggering number of reported gang rapes and child sexual 
assault the New South Wales Rape Crisis Centre reported 196 adults stepping 
forward for the first time to admit they were sexually assaulted when they 
were children. There were 77 people aged 55 and older who reported being 
raped. In addition, the bureau report showed that 63 people contacted the 
                                                           
78
  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW, s 61 HA(3). 
79
  Miller (2007). 
250 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 2 
service believing they had fallen prey to sexual assault as a result of drink 
spiking.80  
In January 2008, the most recent in a series of recent (twenty-first century) 
reforms to the New South Wales substantive and evidentiary rape laws, of which 
section 61 HA(3) of the New South Wales Crimes Act formed part, came into force. 
Those reforms focus on a redefinition and reframing of consent of the kind Miller 
identifies as paradigmatic of rape law reform under biopolitical sovereignty:81 
placing the burden of proof of the victim’s consent on the defendant.82 Both this 
reform and related procedural reforms had been impelled in significant part by 
aspects of contemporary (and specifically post-9/11) race relations in Australia: the 
widely-reported ‘gang rapes’ of Anglo-Australian women and girls by ‘Islamic’ 
men and boys to which I have referred earlier.83 These statutes are not the only texts 
generated by these events and their discursive construction in Australian media, 
governmental and law reform institutions. The journalist Paul Sheehan’s virulently 
Islamophobic Girls Like You: Four Young Girls, Six Brothers, and a Cultural 
Timebomb,84 which followed his extensive coverage of these cases in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, and rape survivor Tegan Wagner’s The Making of Me: Finding 
My Future After Assault,85 both tell stories about rape; some of the recent statutory 
reforms were indeed directly responsive to Sheehan’s and Wagner’s (and other 
victims of the Skaf and K perpetrators) telling stories about rape, and law, and 
visions of justice rather than to the recommendations of professional law 
reformers;86 such speech likewise (proximately) brought the formal law reform 
initiative itself into being.87  
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While the shifting of the burden of proof of consent may be characteristic of 
biopolitical rape law reform, the reform to the definition of the mens rea for sexual 
assault in New South Wales, which is ‘knowledge’ of non-consent, is especially 
remarkable, offering space for the exercising of ‘experiment[s] in thought’88 of the 
kind Constable describes as apt to rhetoricians of law. It effectively defines 
‘knowledge’ as knowledge, recklessness or negligence.89 One could say many things 
about the provision, including admiring the ingenuity with which positive law’s 
silence about the experience and facticity of rape was made to speak about what 
‘simple rape’, which is actually the dominant reality of rape, is; or registering the 
sleight of hand that has redefined a restrictive mens rea term so it no longer means 
itself, has become untethered from doctrine’s solipsism. Or one could marvel at 
how the law was made to speak differently, to hear volumes about the experience of 
women and girls like the victims in Baby and John Z that is usually consigned to 
silence or inaudibility in the institutional and discursive lacunae that constitute 
attrition, precisely because Tegan Wagner — a girl much like them — spectacularly 
broke silence about her rape, ‘mark[ing] the place of the oppressed, of victims, of 
the powerless’.90  
What I will conclude about it is, however, rather different — indeed dissonant. 
First, the resonating histories of the texts of positive law’s refigurings of rape do not 
encourage unreflective hope, or perhaps any hope, that these reforms will alter 
attrition or do justice to those who experience rape or live lives diminished and 
circumscribed by its shadows. Further, if Ruth Miller’s disconcerting account of the 
emergence of the new passive feminine, universal citizen of modern biopolitics is 
correct — and the texts of the New South Wales Parliament’s legislative sessions 
introducing the state’s recent rape law reforms, with their focus on the consent of 
the victim and on her bodily integrity, are replete with evidence that (at least for a 
rhetorician) suggest it is — not merely the reduction of women’s bodies to passive 
space,91 starkly visible in the persisting sections of the definition of sexual assault in 
New South Wales (themselves the creatures of twentieth century reforms) is in 
evidence: 
(1) For the purposes of this Division, sexual intercourse means:  
(a) sexual connection occasioned by the penetration to any extent of the 
genitalia (including a surgically constructed vagina) of a female 
person or the anus of any person by:  
(i)  any part of the body of another person, or 
(ii) any object manipulated by another person, except where the 
penetration is carried out for proper medical purposes, or 
(b) sexual connection occasioned by the introduction of any part of the 
penis of a person into the mouth of another person, or 
(c) cunnilingus, or 
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(d) the continuation of sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (a), (b) 
or (c).92  
There is also evidence in the texts surrounding the reforms that in biopolitical 
regimes, including Hartcher’s discourse on children and elderly women — 
paradigmatically ‘innocent’, and thus deserving, victims because their integrity and 
autonomy, the latter figured as the incapacity to consent — are taken for granted, 
written on their bodies, ‘[r]ape is a crime not because there is an absence of consent, 
but because sex is an assault on politically defined biological boundaries’93: 
The conflation of autonomy and integrity that we see … in contemporary 
rape legislation — the positing of an attack on both in the event of criminal 
sex — produces an important backdrop for early twenty-first century 
sovereign relations … The result is a completely passive sexualized body, a 
body ready (via integrity) and willing (via autonomy) to operate as a setting 
for the spectacle of the rule of law.94 
Law’s somatechnological production of women’s gendered bodies, then, 
operates at once to promise the archetypically sexually passive ‘intact’ woman or 
girl that her ‘human dignity’ — the currency of rights, which government bestows 
while representing itself as fettered by them — and the ‘citizenship’ which binds 
her to, and defines her in terms of, her subjection to the governmentality contiguous 
with the nation formed upon ‘boundaries, and enemies’,95 and to ensure that they are 
partial, ‘prosthetic’.96 It effaces the gendered violence its institutions, discourses and 
subjects — from perpetrators to police to prosecutors — make real in the lives of 
rape’s real victims, and all women who live in the shadows cast by the 
‘inexhaustible futurity’97 that fear of rape shares with fear of terrorism, playing out 
the logic of the liberal state, promising gender equality while delivering the 
inequality on which it is hierarchically predicated.98 
If law always-already writes itself on bodies, then texts always bespeak 
contexts. The emergent biopolitical discourse on the rape victim/citizen who, so the 
texts of and discourses on New South Wales’ recent rape law reforms suggest, at 
last calls positive law and society to ‘justice’ is likely to operate as biopolitics does, 
managing populations, ‘turn[ing] sex into something in need of constant 
regulation’.99 Other ways of thinking about the disciplinary operation of rape law in 
other centuries have suggested that legal institutions’ failure adequately to respond 
— on liberal and many radical feminist accounts — to rape’s marginalised 
paradigm case advanced governmental economic interests in limiting the numbers 
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of illegitimate children in seventeenth century Massachusetts, as well as a 
governmentally privileged communitarian ideology grounded in religious 
morality.100 It likewise operated as a ‘pedagogy of sexual behaviour’, educating the 
population of late twentieth century Britain about ‘the forms of behavior which 
guarantee legal protection, and those which lead to exposure and punishment’,101 
and thus, inter alia, contributing significantly to rape attrition.  
There is evidence, starkly visible in Sheehan’s representation of the victims of 
the K rape cases, that these governmental investments and disciplinary effects are 
likewise congruent with the interests of contemporary biopolitical sovereignty, 
‘disciplin[ing] the body’s biological substance in order to maximize its productive 
capability, [its availability for education, socially-sanctioned reproduction, and 
wage work] while simultaneously increasing its docility … aimed at the body’s 
“integration into systems of efficient and economic control”’;102 deploying the 
body’s ‘generative and reproductive capacities … as a resource upon which 
sovereign power could draw’.103 For all its performance of empathy for the victims 
and overt critique of a legal system that does not accede to his demand that 
offenders like the K brothers, embodiments of ‘a type of … incipient criminality’,104 
culturally racialised bearers of a ‘taken-for-granted criminal status’,105 be denied the 
criminal procedural ‘liberties and rights’106 that keep the white perpetrators of most 
of the rapes, the ‘simple’ rapes that are in fact intractable to liberal legality and are 
denied recognition of their overwhelming reality unprosecuted and unpunished, 
Sheehan has other fish to fry.  
Sheehan’s text is profoundly complicit with state power’s interest in 
maintaining rape attrition, using ‘non-normative expression[s]’ of sexuality as 
‘pretext for the disciplinary intervention of institutions such as the … [educated 
white middle class] family’, 107 the school and the law, in the latter case with the 
repetitive violence it exacts on women who have the temerity to seek legal redress 
for rape, vividly chronicled in the survivor testimony reported in A Gap or a 
Chasm108 
Cassie, thirteen when she was raped, never recovered enough stability to 
attend school, because of all the delays in her trial dates. ‘She hasn’t gone to 
bloody school because of all this’, her mother told me. She was living with 
her mother and had a boyfriend. Like her mother before her, who was gang-
raped in her teens and pregnant by the time she was 21, Cassie herself 
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became pregnant when young. On 12 January 2006, she gave birth to a 
healthy baby boy. The mother was seventeen. The father was eighteen.109  
Like the adjudicators of the ‘withdrawn consent’ rape cases, Sheehan purports 
to be able to tell the difference between ‘acquaintance’ or ‘simple’ rape and real 
rape: in Girls Like You, it happens when the victims are white and the perpetrators 
are Islamic. Sheehan’s text overtly excoriates the legal system for its inadequate 
response to the social harm of rape, contextually ironically presented as a paradigm 
of a miscarriage of justice when those accused are Islamic men who are at once 
‘gang rapists’ and ‘acquaintance rapists’ of white Australian girls. Its real political 
investments are in deploying ‘racializing somatechnologies … in order to reproduce 
racist stereotypes and foment cultural panics’,110 as it signals in matters such as 
devoting its penultimate chapter to Sheik Taj Din al-Hilaly’s notorious and 
misogynistic ‘cat’s meat’ address, represented as evidence of treason against 
‘Australian’ society’s values of tolerance’;111 the title of its opening chapter, ‘Anzac 
Bridge’; its extended identification in the early chapter, ‘Scorpions and Rock 
Spiders’, of the K brothers as ethnically Pashtun immigrants; and its 
characterisation of ‘ethnic Pashtuns … [as] the wellspring of the Taliban, the most 
extreme of fundamentalists, who took power in Afghanistan by force during the late 
1990s, then harboured Osama bin Laden and his organisation as it planned the 
attacks of September 11, 2001’.112 Pashtun culture, ‘primitive … [and] more severe 
than Koranic law’, produced not only the Taliban, but the K brothers: 
Pashtun culture was not noted for its embrace of feminism. Clan and family 
were far more important than country, which explained why the Ks did 
everything together in Australia, and why two of the brothers, Sami and 
Yusef, married two teenage sisters from their local community and had 
children within a year of marriage.113 
Sheehan’s text and the rape reforms his journalism in part engendered are, 
then, paradigmatic texts of the ‘reactive hypermasculinity’ characteristic of both 
Osama bin Laden and many Western politicians post 9/11.114 Like that of Hartcher, 
Sheehan’s rhetoric of Australian values operates to construct the victims of Islamic 
sexual predators as needing ‘protect[ion] by [the] hypermasculinized patriarch[al 
state]’,115 constructing their bodies and their selves as sites for the expression of 
‘desire for an execution of “national security”’ … [represented by] sovereign, stable 
boundaries and identities’, as embodiments of the violation of ‘sovereign desire …, 
provoking fears of an external threat and danger usually embodied by the alien, 
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barbaric Other’.116 The irony of this usage of ‘racism, sexism, and neocolonialism to 
deflect and distract social dissent’117 for the purposes of neocolonial governmentality 
in a white colonial nation whose deployment of interracial sexual violence in 
furtherance of the nation-building logic of genocide is savage, if tragically 
predictable: ‘sexual matters [are] … foundational to the material terms in which 
colonial projects were carried out’.118  
History suggests, then, that the simple rapes that are the real rapes, the 
‘marginal’ cases that in fact are the overwhelming numerical centre, will continue 
to operate to discipline the real rape victims who are not ‘really’ raped. In the 
‘twenty-first century “spectacular post-democratic society,” … a society in which 
“politics knows no value (and consequently no non-value) other than life”’,119 they 
will remain exceptional, marginal, except insofar as some of them can be framed 
and cultivated as sites for the production of a biopolitics of hate, the management of 
a multiracial and multiethnic population and of the nation’s porous boundaries, 
whether geographic or constituted by the passive feminine citizen upon whom the 
biopolitical state confers ‘rights’ that collapse consent and bodily integrity; and the 
displacing on to ‘others’ of responsibility for what Tegan Wagner, unlike Paul 
Sheehan, is clear-eyed enough to see: ‘Australian guys rape women too.’120  
The US history of the imbrications of race and rape until the middle of the 
twentieth century suggests that when (white) women were meted out a little of what 
might — or might not — pass for justice in the operation of rape law, it was at the 
expense of injustice experienced by men (and women) of colour, all contributing to 
the reproduction of ‘sexual-property rules’ in a stratified market in ‘sexual-property 
relations’ controlled by white men.121 Recent sexual offenses legislation in Australia 
— the consent reforms122 referred to above and related evidentiary reforms which, 
for example, prevent an unrepresented rape defendant from cross-examining his 
victim,123 together with other recent legislation directed at ‘date rape drugs’124 and 
‘sexually violent predators’125 — can be read not as ‘progressive’ reforms able at 
last to do justice to the state of exception in which simple rape really flourishes and 
women’s citizenship is at once paradigmatic and partial, but as a biopolitical 
technique for production of a new category of ‘real’ rape, committed by newly 
cultivated categories of strangers to be managed, not men and boys ‘like us’: 
foreigners, of whom the Islamic immigrant and the ‘animal’ who is the sexually 
violent predator are the (present) paradigm. And likewise, they can be read as a way 
to manage a passive citizenry through techniques drawn from the politics of hate 
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and fear, and through the newly paradigmatic category of rights-bearing citizen 
subjects who continue to be the victims of most rapes, because: 
Only a sober young woman, who does not have a bad reputation, who has not 
behaved sexually provocatively and who has said no in the right way can be 
raped, and only by a young man who is sober and ‘deviant’ and with whom 
she is not in love.126  
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